Japanese naval officer, born in Nagaoka, Japan. He trained at the Naval Academy, Etajima, and became naval attaché at the Japanese embassy in the USA (19268), chief of the aviation department of the Japanese navy (1935), and vice-navy minister (19369). Admiral (1940), and commander-in-chief of the combined fleet (193943), he planned and directed the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. His forces were defeated at the Battle of Midway (June 1942), and he was killed when his plane was shot down over the Solomon Is.
| Isoroku Yamamoto | |
|---|---|
| 4 April 1884 – 18 April 1943 | |
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Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto |
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| Place of birth | Nagaoka, Niigata, Japan |
| Place of death | Solomon Islands |
| Allegiance | Empire of Japan |
| Years of service | 1901-1943 |
| Rank | Admiral |
| Unit | Imperial Japanese Navy |
| Commands | Imperial Japanese Navy |
| Battles/wars |
Russo-Japanese War World War II |
| Awards |
Grand Cordon of the Supreme Order of the Chrysanthemum(Japan's highest order) Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun Paulownia Blossoms, Grand Cordon of the Order of the Sacred Treasure, Order of the Golden Kite (1st class), Order of the Golden Kite (2nd class), Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords (Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes, Nazi Germany) |
Isoroku Yamamoto (Japanese: 山本五十六, Yamamoto Isoroku) (4 April 1884 – 18 April 1943) was a Fleet Admiral (Admiral) in the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) during the first four years of World War II, graduate of Imperial Japanese Naval Academy and alumnus of U.S. Naval War College and Harvard University (1919 - 1921).
He is considered to be one of Japan's talented and most influential naval strategists and tacticians and is highly respected in Japan, and to a lesser extent, the United States for both tactical prowess and for preventing his men from committing war crimes.
Family background
Yamamoto was born Isoroku Takano in Nagaoka, Niigata.
In 1916, Isoroku was adopted into the Yamamoto family and took the Yamamoto name.
Early career
After graduating from the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy in 1904, Yamamoto served on the cruiser Nisshin during the Russo-Japanese War.
Preparing for war, 1920s and 1930s
Yamamoto was a political dove and was fundamentally opposed to war with the United States by virtue of studies at U.S. Naval War College and Harvard University (1919-1921), his tour as an admiral's aide, and two postings as naval attaché in Washington D.C. His first command was the cruiser Isuzu in 1928, followed by the aircraft carrier Akagi. Yamamoto was a strong proponent of naval aviation, and (as vice admiral) served as head of the Aeronautics’ Department before accepting a post as commander of the First Carrier Division.
He participated in the second London Naval Conference of 1930 as a rear admiral and the 1934 London Naval Conference as a vice admiral, as the government felt that a career military specialist needed to accompany the diplomats to the arms limitations talks. Yamamoto personally opposed the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the subsequent land war with China (1937), and the Tripartite Pact (1940) with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.
He was reassigned from the Navy Ministry to sea as Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet (30 August 1939), partly to make him harder for assassins to reach. Yamamoto warned Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe with a prescient statement to avoid war with the United States: "If I am told to fight...
In naval matters, Yamamoto opposed the building of the super-battleships Yamato and Musashi as an unwise investment of resources.
Yamamoto was responsible for a number of innovations in Japanese Naval Aviation. Although remembered for his association with aircraft carriers due to Pearl Harbor and Midway, Yamamoto did more to influence the development of land-based naval aviation, particularly the G3M and G4M medium bombers.
As Japan moved toward war during 1940, Yamamoto gradually moved toward strategic as well as tactical innovation, again with mixed results. Prompted by talented young officers such as Minoru Genda, Yamamoto approved the reorganization of Japanese carrier forces into the First Air Fleet, a consolidated striking force that gathered Japan's six largest carriers into one unit. Yamamoto also oversaw the organization of a similar large land-based organization in the 11th Air Fleet, which would later use the G3M and G4M to neutralize American air forces in the Philippines and sink the British Force "Z".
In January 1941, Yamamoto went even farther and proposed a radical revision of Japanese naval strategy. For two decades, the Naval General Staff had planned in terms of Japanese light surface forces, submarines and land-based air units whittling down the American Fleet as it advanced across the Pacific until engaging in a climactic "Decisive Battle" in the northern Philippine Sea between the Ryūkyū Islands on the west and the Marianas Islands on the east.
Correctly pointing out that this plan had never worked even in Japanese war games, and painfully aware of American strategic advantages in military productive capacity, Yamamoto proposed instead to seek a decision with the Americans by first reducing their forces with a preemptive strike, and then following that with a "Decisive Battle" that would be sought offensively, rather than defensively. Yamamoto hoped, but probably did not believe, that if the Americans could be dealt such terrific blows early in the war, they might be willing to negotiate an end to the conflict. Tora!
The Naval General Staff proved reluctant to go along and Yamamoto was eventually driven to capitalize on his popularity in the fleet by threatening to resign to get his way.
The First Air Fleet commenced preparations for the Pearl Harbor Raid, solving a number of technical problems along the way, including how to launch torpedoes in the shallow water of Pearl Harbor and how to craft armor-piercing bombs by machining down battleship gun projectiles.
The attack on Pearl Harbor, 1941
As Yamamoto had planned, the First Air Fleet of six carriers armed with about 400 planes, commenced hostilities against the Americans on 7 December 1941, launching 358 of those aircraft against Pearl Harbor in two waves.
In fact, five American battleships were sunk, three more damaged, and ten other cruisers, destroyers and auxiliaries were sunk or seriously damaged. Yamamoto later lamented that Nagumo did not seize the initiative to seek out and destroy the American carriers that were absent from the harbor, or further bombard various strategically important facilities on Oahu. Much has been made of Yamamoto's hindsight and wishful thinking, but it is instructive to note that he did not punish Nagumo in any way for his withdrawal, which was, after all, according to plan, and the prudent course to take.
On the political level, the attack was a disaster for Japan, rousing American passions for revenge due to its being a "sneak attack".
As a strategic blow intended to prevent American interference in the Netherlands East Indies for six months, the attack was a success, but unbeknownst to Yamamoto, a pointless one.
Six months of victories, December 1941 to May 1942
With the American Fleet largely neutralized at Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto's Combined Fleet turned to the task of executing the larger Japanese war plan devised by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy General Staff.
Under Yamamoto's able subordinates, Vice Admirals Ozawa, Kondo and Takahashi, the Japanese swept the inadequate remaining American, British, Dutch and Australian naval assets from the Netherlands East Indies in a series of amphibious landings and surface naval battles that culminated in the Battle of the Java Sea on 27 February 1942.
Having achieved their initial aims with surprising speed and little loss (albeit against enemies ill-prepared to resist them), the Japanese paused to consider their next moves.
Competing plans developed at this stage, including thrusts to the west against India, the south against Australia and the east against the United States. Yamamoto was involved in this debate, supporting different plans at different times with varying degrees of enthusiasm and for varying purposes, including "horse-trading" for support of his objectives. Yamamoto agitated for an offensive Decisive Battle in the east to finish the American fleet, but the more conservative staff officers were unwilling to risk it.
In the midst of theses debates, the Doolittle Raid struck Tokyo and the surrounding areas, galvanizing the threat posed by the American aircraft carriers that had launched it in the minds of the staff officers, and giving Yamamoto an event he could exploit to get his way. The Naval General Staff agreed to Yamamoto's Midway (MI) Operation, subsequent to the first phase of the operations against Australia's link with America.
Yamamoto rushed planning for the Midway venture and the concurrent diversionary effort against the Aleutians, while dispatching a force under Rear Admiral Takeo Takagi, including the Fifth Carrier Division (the large, new carriers Shōkaku and Zuikaku), to support the effort to seize the islands of Tulagi and Guadalcanal for seaplane and airplane bases, and the town of Port Moresby on Papua New Guinea's south coast facing Australia. Although Tulagi and Guadalcanal were taken, the Port Moresby invasion fleet turned back when Takagi clashed with an American carrier task force in the Battle of the Coral Sea in early May. Although the Japanese sank a large American carrier in exchange for a smaller carrier, the Americans damaged the carrier Shōkaku so badly she required dockyard repairs.
The Battle of Midway, June 1942
Yamamoto's plan for the Midway (MI) Operation was an extension of Yamamoto's efforts to knock the U.S. Pacific Fleet out of action long enough for Japan to fortify its defensive perimeter in the Pacific island chains. Yamamoto felt it would be necessary to seek an early, offensive decisive battle.
Yamamoto's plan was to draw American attention—and possibly carrier forces—north from Pearl Harbor by sending his Fifth Fleet (2 light carriers, 5 cruisers, 13 destroyers and 4 transports) against the Aleutians, raiding Dutch Harbor on Unalaska Island and invading the more distant islands of Kiska and Attu.
The following day, the First Mobile Force (4 carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, and 12 destroyers) would raid Midway and destroy its air force.
The seizure of Midway was expected to draw the American carriers west into a trap where the First Mobile Force would engage and destroy them. Afterward, the First Fleet (1 light carrier, 7 battleships, 3 cruisers and 13 destroyers), in conjunction with elements of the Second Fleet would mop up remaining American surface forces and complete the destruction of the Pacific Fleet.
To guard against mischance, Yamamoto initiated two security measures.
Unfortunately for Yamamoto, something extraordinary had happened. As a result, Admiral Chester Nimitz, the Pacific Fleet commander, was able to circumvent both of Yamamoto's security measures and position his outnumbered forces in the exact position to conduct a devastating ambush.
Admiral Nimitz dispatched a destroyer to guard the intended refueling point of Operation K's flying boats, causing the reconnaissance mission to be aborted and leaving Yamamoto ignorant of whether the Pacific Fleet was still at Pearl Harbor. He also dispatched his carriers toward Midway early, and they passed the Japanese submarine picket line before the Japanese submarines arrived, negating Yamamoto's back-up security measure. The Aleutians feint was properly ignored, and days before Yamamoto and his forces could reasonably expect American carriers to interfere in the Midway operation, they destroyed the four carriers of the First Mobile Force on 4 June 1942 in an attack that caught the Japanese carriers at precisely their most vulnerable moment.
With his air power destroyed and his forces not yet concentrated for a fleet battle, Yamamoto was unable to maneuver his remaining units to trap the American forces when their tactical commander Admiral Raymond Spruance, prudently withdrew to the east rather than risk a night surface encounter in which his carriers would be at a disadvantage. Correctly perceiving that he had lost, Yamamoto aborted the invasion of Midway and withdrew his forces from the field, having no desire to occupy a distant atoll he no longer had the capacity to support and defend. The defeat ended Yamamoto's six months of success and marked the high tide of Japanese expansion.
Yamamoto's plan for the MI Operation has been the subject of much criticism.
Actions after Midway
The Battle of Midway solidly checked Japanese momentum, but it was not actually the turning point of the Pacific War. To this end, development of the airfield on Guadalcanal continued and attracted the baleful eye of Yamamoto's opposite number, Admiral Ernest King.
King ramrodded the American invasion of Guadalcanal and beat the Japanese to the punch, descending on the island in August 1942 and precipitating a bitter struggle that lasted until February 1943 and commenced a battle of attrition Japan could ill-afford. Admiral Yamamoto remained in command, retained at least partly to avoid diminishing the morale of the Combined Fleet. This reduced Yamamoto to pursuing the classic defensive Decisive Battle strategy he had attempted to overturn.
Guadalcanal caught the Japanese over-extended and attempting to support fighting in New Guinea while guarding the Central Pacific and preparing to conduct the FS Operation.
Yamamoto committed Combined Fleet units to a series of small attrition actions that stung the Americans, but suffered losses he could ill-afford in return. Three major efforts to carry the island precipitated a pair of carrier battles that Yamamoto commanded personally at the Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz Islands in September and October, and finally a wild pair of surface engagements in November, all timed to coincide with Japanese Army pushes. Yamamoto's forces caused considerable loss and damage, but he could never draw the Americans into a decisive fleet action.
Particularly harmful were the severe losses of carrier dive-bomber and torpedo-bomber crews in the carrier battles that emasculated the carrier air groups. Yamamoto shifted the load of the air battle from the depleted carriers to the land-based naval air forces. Some of these units were positioned at forward bases in the Solomon Islands, and while on an inspection trip to these positions on 18 April 1943, Yamamoto once more fell victim—this time personally—to American code-breaking.
Yamamoto's death
To boost morale following Guadalcanal, Yamamoto decided to make an inspection tour throughout the South Pacific. On 14 April 1943, the US naval intelligence effort, code-named "Magic", intercepted and decrypted a message containing specific details regarding Yamamoto's tour, including arrival and departure times and locations, as well as the number and types of planes that would transport and accompany him on the journey. Yamamoto, the itinerary revealed, would be flying from Rabaul to Ballalae Airfield, on an island near Bougainville in the Solomon Islands, on the morning of 18 April 1943.
Admiral Nimitz consulted Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., Commander, South Pacific, then authorized a mission on 17 April to intercept Yamamoto's flight en route and down it.
The 339th Fighter Squadron of the 347th Fighter Group, 13th Air Force, was assigned the mission, since only their P-38 Lightning aircraft possessed the range to intercept and engage.
On the morning of April 18, despite urgings by local commanders to cancel the trip for fear of ambush, Yamamoto's planes left Rabaul as scheduled for the 315-mile trip. At 09:34 Tokyo time, the two flights met and a dogfight ensued between the P-38s and the six Zeroes escorting Yamamoto. Barber engaged the first of the two Japanese bombers, which turned out to be Yamamoto's plane. Barber turned away to attack the other bomber as Yamamoto's plane crashed into the jungle.
The crash site and body of Admiral Yamamoto were found the next day in the jungle north of the then-coastal site of the former Australian patrol post of Buin by a Japanese search and rescue party, led by Army engineer Lieutenant Hamasuna. According to Hamasuna, Yamamoto had been thrown clear of the plane's wreckage, his white-gloved hand grasping the hilt of his samurai sword, still upright in his seat under a tree. To cover up the fact that the Allies were reading Japanese code, American news agencies were told that civilian coast-watchers in the Solomon Islands saw Yamamoto boarding a bomber in the area. They also didn't publicize the names of the pilots that attacked Yamamotos plane because one of them had a brother who was a prisoner of the Japanese and U.S. military officials feared for his safety.
Captain Watanabe and his staff cremated Yamamoto's remains at Buin, and the ashes were returned to Tokyo aboard the battleship Musashi, Yamamoto's last flagship. Yamamoto was given a full state funeral on 3 June 1943, where he received, posthumously, the title of Fleet Admiral and awarded the Order of the Chrysanthemum, (1st Class). Reiko revealed to the Japanese public in 1954 that Yamamoto was closer to his favorite geisha Kawai Chiyoko than to her, which stirred some controversy His award of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross was somewhat ironic, due to the fact that he mistrusted the Nazis
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