Arthur Zimmermann - His career, The Kronrat, His resignation, Background to the telegram, The sending of the telegram

Politician, born in Olecko, NE Poland (formerly Marggrabowa, East Prussia). After diplomatic service in China, he directed from 1904 the E division of the German foreign office, and was foreign secretary (Nov 1916–Aug 1917). In January 1917 he sent the famous Zimmermann telegram to the German minister in Mexico with the terms of an alliance between Mexico and Germany, by which Mexico was to attack the USA with German and Japanese assistance in return for the American states of New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. This telegram, intercepted and decoded by British Admiralty Intelligence, finally brought the hesitant US government into the war against Germany in April 1917.

Arthur Zimmermann (October 5, 1864 - June 6, 1940) was Germany's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from November 22, 1916, until his resignation on August 6, 1917. His name is associated with the Zimmermann Telegram during World War I.

His career

He was born in Marggrabova (now part of Olecko, Mazury, Poland) in East Prussia, and died of pneumonia in Berlin.

Later he was called to the Foreign Office, became Under Secretary of State in 1911, and on November 24, 1916, he accepted his confirmation as Secretary of State, succeeding Gottlieb von Jagow in this position.

The Kronrat

As acting secretary he had also taken part in the so-called Kronrat, the deliberations in 1914, with Kaiser Wilhelm II and Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, in which the decision was taken to support Austria-Hungary after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria at Sarajevo, which ultimately was to lead to the outbreak of war.

His resignation

On August 6, 1917, he resigned as foreign secretary and was succeeded by Richard von Kühlmann.

One of the causes of his resignation was the famous telegram he sent on January 16, 1917.

After the Royal Navy had been engaged in a successful naval blockade against all German shipping for some time, the German Supreme High Command concluded that only a total submarine offensive would break the stranglehold.

See Zimmermann telegram for a detailed description of the telegram and the events surrounding it.

Background to the telegram

Germany had been pursuing various interests in Mexico from the beginning of the 20th century. During Arthur Zimmermann's period in office, among the options discussed, Germany offered to improve communications between the two nations and suggested that Mexico purchase German submarines for its navy.

After Francisco Villa's cross-border raids into New Mexico, President Wilson sent a punitive expedition into Mexico to pursue the raiders. It was then, that the Germans were encouraged to believe (mistakenly) that this and other concerns in the area, would tie up US resources and military operations for some time to come, sufficiently to justify the overtures made by Arthur Zimmermann in the telegram to the Venustiano Carranza government. The proposals included an agreement for a German alliance with Mexico, while Germany would still try to maintain a state of neutrality with the United States.

It is against this background that the Zimmermann telegram has to be seen.

The sending of the telegram

On 16 January 1917 Foreign Secretary Zimmermann sent the telegram to the German ambassador in Washington, Johann von Bernstorff, who in his turn forwarded it secretly to the German ambassador in Mexico, Heinrich von Eckardt.

British intelligence intercepted it on 17 January, but were unable to decipher it at that stage as it had been sent in a new code which neither the British cryptographers nor the German embassy in Mexico possessed.

It was at this stage that British intelligence realized that to transmit the telegram without delay to President Wilson would indicate to the Germans that Britain was able to decipher their codes, a fact which would jeopardize British intelligence operations.

Its effect

On February 24, the telegram was finally delivered to the US ambassador in Britain, Walter Hines Page, who two days later retransmitted it to President Wilson. On March 1, the United States Government passed the text of the telegram to the press.

At first, some sectors of the US papers, especially those of the Hearst press empire, tried to claim that the telegram was a forgery by British intelligence in an attempt to persuade the US government to enter the war on Britain's side. This opinion was reinforced by German and Mexican diplomats, as well as pro-German and pacifist opinion-formers in the United States. However, on March 29, 1917, Arthur Zimmermann gave a speech confirming the text of the telegram and so put an end to all speculation as to its authenticity.

By that time a number of US ships had been torpedoed with heavy loss of life, and on April 2, President Wilson asked Congress to agree to declare war on Germany, and on April 6 Congress complied.

Arthur Zimmermann's speech

The speech was intended to explain his side of the situation.

He also said that despite the submarine offensive, he had hoped that the USA would remain neutral. In fact, he blamed President Wilson for breaking off relations with Germany "with extraordinary roughness" after the telegram was received, and that therefore the German ambassador "no longer had the opportunity to explain the German attitude, and that the US government had declined to negotiate".

Thinking that the USA would remain neutral while their ships were being attacked does indicate extreme naivety on Arthur Zimmermann's part. However, it is possible he was hoping (in an equally naïve way) the world would see the desperate situation Germany had found itself in during the blockade of German shipping, and it would bring some understanding to that situation.

There was honesty in his speech since he would have had occasion to reflect on the impact of the telegram and its aftereffects in the meantime, yet still was prepared to present its original ideas.

Mexico's reply

Later, a general assigned by Carranza to assess the realities of a Mexican takeover of their former provinces came to the conclusion that it would not work.

Carranza declined Zimmermann's proposals on April 14.

The fact-finding mission of Nuncio Pacelli

At the end of June 1917, Zimmermann found the first real opportunity for paving the way to peace negotiations during his period of administration.

That none of these plans came to fruition was due to the fact that neither of the two German participants would be very much longer in office.

As an afterthought, it was Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's belief – unlike that of the General Staff's – that once the United States entered the war, the prospects for Germany would indeed be bleak.

Nurse Edith Cavell's execution

Arthur Zimmermann as foreign secretary also felt called upon to comment on Edith Cavell's execution by firing squad on October 12, 1915.

He continued by saying that although it was a terrible thing that the woman had been executed, consideration should be given to the consequences if a state, particularly one at war, were to leave women unpunished after they had committed crimes aimed at the safety of its armies.

Looked at in those days, although it was part of his office to defend the indefensible, to the world it would have been easy to condemn him for this, especially since these crimes in peacetime almost certainly would have been no crimes at all.

Peace in the East

In March 1917, with the imminent collapse of the Russian front, Zimmermann took steps to promote Peace in the East with the Russians, a proposal that was of immense importance to Germany at the time. These proposals once carried out, would free Germany's armies in the east and allow them to be concentrated in the west, a master-stroke that would reinforce the German western front vastly.