domino theory - Conceptual roots, Background, Controversy, Al Qaeda and terrorism in the Middle East

A political theory first used by President Eisenhower in 1954, reflecting the view that, as neighbouring states are so interdependent, the collapse of one will spread to the others. The theory particularly relates to military collapse, but also covers insurgence, and is used to justify intervention in a country not immediately threatened, but whose neighbour is. It was an important element in the US policy of intervention in SE Asia in the 1960s and 1970s, and in Central America in the 1980s.

The domino theory was a 20th Century foreign policy theory that speculated if one land in a region came under the influence of Communists, then more would follow in a domino effect. The domino effect indicates that some change, small in itself, will cause a similar change nearby, which then will cause another similar change, and so on in linear sequence, by analogy to a falling row of dominoes standing on end.

The theory was used by many United States leaders during the Cold War to justify U.S. intervention in the Vietnam War. The domino theory was applied by President Dwight D. After the U.S. left Vietnam, the North took over the South, and Cambodia and Laos had also turned to Communism, although Cambodia is no longer a communist state.

In the 1980s, the domino theory was used again to justify the Reagan administration's interventions in Central America and the Caribbean region.

From its first conception, many have disputed central assumptions of the domino theory, for instance by arguing that Communist States lacked the tradition of cooperation the theory assumes (eg Cambodia attacked Vietnam, to which Vietnam responded by overthrowing the Khmer Rouge government).

Conceptual roots

The domino theory is based on three assumptions about alliance formation.

With the above in mind, the domino theory unfolds as follows. According to the domino theory, even a single successful display of superior force by one coalition can trigger a domino effect whereby one state after another will choose to align with the stronger coalition (since states are attracted to power and credibility). It stands to reason that if two or more coalitions are battling for allies, the domino effect is a valuable (albeit risky) foreign policy instrument. For instance, in regions of the world where states remain largely unaligned, the domino theory predicts that even one ill-timed display of weakness by one coalition leader can trigger the domino effect in which the unaligned states join the opposing side in succession.

In strategic thinking about the domino theory, ideology often plays a leading role. Because ideologically similar states can easily unite according to the domino theory, coalition leaders must pay particular attention to unaligned states in which ideologies are battling for supremacy. Apparently, if a coalition leader, who supports one ideology over others, displays weakness in its international engagements, the battling factions in unaligned states will naturally reject the losing ideology and possibly unite under one of its more robust rivals. Clearly then, if an ideology underscores universal domination, it is imperative that the coalition leaders, who will be negatively affected by its ascendancy, never allow it to spread, especially by triggering the domino effect.

Background

The domino theory was first espoused by name by President Eisenhower in an April 7, 1954 news conference , and was originally applied to Indochina. Eisenhower's domino theory of 1954 was a specific description of the situation and conditions within Southeast Asia at the time. Eisenhower did not suggest a generalized domino theory as others did afterward.

The domino theory was expounded periodically since 1954 by top U.S. leaders who used it as a justification for expanding military programs throughout the world and more specifically intervention in Southeast Asia. Eisenhower first propped up the French in Indochina and then assisted in the creation of South Vietnam to protect what was considered an important "domino". The Kennedy administration intervened in Vietnam in the early 1960s to, among other reasons, keep the South Vietnamese "domino" from falling.

Controversy

The primary evidence for the domino theory is the communist rule of Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979, who set about establishing what they thought would be a communist utopia (but turned out to be one of the bloodiest regimes in the history of communism).

The primary evidence against the domino theory is the failure of communism to take hold in Thailand, Indonesia, and other large southeast Asian countries after the end of the Vietnam War, as Eisenhower's speech argued it would. Walt Rostow has argued that the U.S. intervention in Indochina, by giving the nations of ASEAN time to consolidate and engage in economic growth, prevented a wider domino effect. McGeorge Bundy argues that the prospects for a domino effect, though high in the 1950s and early 1960s, were weakened in 1965 when the Indonesian communist party was destroyed.

Some supporters of the domino theory focus on the ability of a communist government in one country to supply communist revolutionaries in neighboring countries, as for instance China supplied the Vietminh.

Critics of the theory charged that the Indochinese wars were largely indigenous or nationalist in nature (such as the Vietnamese driving out the French), that no such monolithic force as "world communism" existed, and that the theory was used as a propaganda scare tactic to try to justify unwarranted intervention policies.

Critics of the theory with regard to Laos and Cambodia point to circumstances in both cases. The fall of Cambodia was due to the Cambodian government allowing North Vietnam to use the country as a base area for its attacks on South Vietnam which dragged the country into the Vietnam war and led to first the Khmer Rouge and then after to military rule for many years by Vietnam.

Michael Lind has argued that though the domino theory failed regionally, there was a global wave, as communist or Marxist-Leninist regimes came to power in Benin, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Angola, Afghanistan, Grenada, and Nicaragua during the 1970s. The global interpretation of the domino effect relies heavily upon the prestige interpretation of the theory.

Al Qaeda and terrorism in the Middle East

A top member of the terrorist organization Al Qaeda, Abu Hafiza, proposed his own domino theory in which large-scale terrorist attacks are used to intimidate the populace of a country into voting against an administration that advocates aggressive anti-terror policies.

Similarly, another new form of the domino theory has been advocated by those who seek to oppose terrorism in the Middle East. Some foreign policy advocates in the United States refer to the potential spread of both Islamic theocracy and liberal democracy in the Middle East as representing a sort of domino theory.